Mini Laptops

Welcome to our site. I found the size of laptops very interesting. However not many websites are devoted or even mention the small mini laptops that have been made by the various laptop manufacturers. Dell, Toshiba, Compaq and even Hewlett Packard have made small laptops that can be considered Mini.
Used Laptops

The used laptops that we found on the web included but are not limited to the Dell Latitude CSx, Latitude C400 or the Latitude L400. Toshiba had the Protégé 3400 series, Compaq had the Armada M300 series and Hewlett Packard had the Omnibook 500 among others as well. These used laptops were small and under 3 pounds. I would consider them mini laptops.

We found a get web page that shows Used Laptop Videos. The list is small at the moment but I have noticed that the list is growing on a daily basis.
Cheap Laptops

Since these laptops are older they are usually cheap laptops in comparison to new laptops. Since they are under 3 pounds their CDROM and floppy drives are usually external which can sometimes be a hassle. Something that you give up with a decrease in size. Hence to be a mini laptop there may be some hassle involved.
Website Reviews

In our travels around the web looking for mini laptops that meet our criteria we came across some nice websites which we will review. We have our favorites and of course our not so favorites. In any case it should give some good reading.

All in all we found the mini laptop fun and in some ways rather popular. They have some real followers that love the small size. In a way the newer laptops have lost the idea of portability with the desktop replacement. After all why do you need a huge laptop to replace a perfectly good desktop. A laptop is for portability and ease of use in a mobile situation. I much prefer the mini laptop. You can also check out the www.mini-notebooks.com website as well. They also talk about the small laptops.

Cross Our Palms With Silver

The future is not yet at its desk. The past is already gone. The present is on break. Such is will of the universe.

But even though you can’t reach the cosmic forces directly, there’s no need to give up. Hundreds of men and women worldwide have a special power that puts them in touch with destiny. In honor of the Dyson DC25 we’re selling today, we’d like to introduce… Char Latean, Psychic Advisor.

How do you do?

Really? Wow. If you have to ask a question like that we must have been wrong about you. Take her away, fellas.

Wait! Wait! It was just casual conversation! An ice breaker! A cultural standard used as a greeting!

Oh. Let her go, fellas, it’s my mistake. Okay, Char, come up here by the Dyson DC25 and tell us what you see.

I see… a ball of light.

Wow! You mean a spirit form?

No, it is a hard plastic, designed to change your direction at the flip of a wrist. Smooth, easy, always in motion. Like the future.

Oh, right, you’re looking at the DC25’s ball motor. That does make the DC25 easier to steer. But we’re interested in the future, Char. What can you tell us about that?

Dust. All is dust.

Dust? You mean we’re all doomed? A war? A plague? The collapse of the Republican Party after Michael Steele fails to grow a backbone?

No, real dust. I’m looking at the HEPA filtration filter.

Oh, right. The DC25 has a clear bin that’s easy to empty. Okay, fair enough, that’s two for two. But how about a hard one? Who’s gonna win the game next week?

I see… I see…

Who, Char? Who? Carolina? Michigan? Pittsburgh, in a surprise re-entry? Radford? Alaska State?

I see… England over the West Indies.

What?

Destiny is not just for Americans, you know. It’s a big world. Cricket is very popular.

Well, there you go. The Dyson DC25’s ball design might be ideal for cleaning your house, but it can’t tell the future worth a darn. Thanks for nothing, Char.

Is the Greek Chorus in today? Can I get an autograph?

Warranty: 6 Month Dyson
Authorized for SquareTrade Extended Warranty

Features:

* Suction power - 220 airwatts (constant)
* Rides on a ball so you can get the vacuum where you need it with out pushing and pulling, back and forth around corners and obstacles
* The motor is stored inside the ball which gives it a lower center of gravity that improves maneuverability
* Conventional upright vacuums sit on four fixed wheels, making them awkward to steer
* Root Cyclone Technology - Uses cyclonic separation to remove dirt from the air with out using a filter.
* Lifetime HEPA Filtration - HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Air) filters can remove 99.97% of airborne particles 0.3 micrometers in diameter. This can trap fine particles such as pollen or other allergens.
* Certified Asthma Friendly - Air expelled from a Dyson DC25 has up to 150 times less mold and bacteria than the air you breathe.
* Easy Empty Bin - Button controlled system allows for a clean and hygienic way to discard dust and dirt it traps.
* On Board Tool Storage - Brush and crevice tools store on the machine.
* Brush Bar - Will protect delicate floors and rugs
* Clear Bin - You can see when the bin should be emptied. No need to buy specific vacuum bags.

Specifications:

* Dimensions: 42.4×15.4×12.2 (HxWxD) inches
* Weight: 16.12 pounds
* Suction power: 220 airwatts (constant)
* Bin capacity: 0.31 gallons
* Cord length: 24.6 ft
* Max reach: 40.3 ft

A computer spammer has hijacked the Cleo Bachelor of the Year competition trying to rig votes in favour of a musician contestant.

A spokeswoman for the magazine said judges became suspicious when they noticed the musician had 15,000 more votes than the next most popular contestant.

They said they believed it was the work of an automated computer system, which can continually send votes to a designated page every 10 seconds.

“We seem to have a very popular bachelor finalist raking up lots of votes,” Cleo’s editor-in-chief Sarah Oakes said.

“In fact, we have never seen voting quite like this which has obviously raised suspicion.”

It’s not clear if the spammer was the actual contestant, or a fan, the spokeswoman said.

The extra votes have been discounted, but the contestant - who they did not wish to name - has not been disqualified.

Fifty men aged between 21 and 39 are up from the title, including singer Axle Whitehead, Daimon Downey from Sneaky Sound System, Angus McLaren from the Seven Network’s Packed to the Rafters program, Carlton AFL footballer Chris Johnson, Underbelly’s Damian Walshe-Howling, Channel V presenter Danny Clayton and Sydney Swans’ star Matthew Laidlaw.

The title is currently held by TV presenter Jason Dundas.

The winner will be announced at a VIP party on the rooftop of the Swiss Grand Hotel at Sydney’s Bondi Beach on April 22.

Apple charged with making ‘explosive’ iPod touch

The first of the lawsuits, filed on Wednesday in a Southern District of Ohio court, claims that Apple negligently built the second-generation iPod touch — incorrectly referred to as an “iTouch” through the entire complaint — with a flaw that ultimately caused serious burns.

In the 14-page suit, Lynette Antrobus of Cincinnati describes buying a 16GB iPod in November that, just two weeks later, exploded in her son’s pocket and not only set his pants on fire but “melted” through to his leg, causing second degree burns. Besides these more immediately obvious losses, Antrobus also claims the impact of the unexpected event will give her son “mental distress” and other problems well past the initial damage done.

Apple didn’t take enough precautions to test the iPod for this kind of risk, she argues, and didn’t adequately warn buyers that there might be a risk. By encouraging owners to keep their iPods close to their bodies, the company created a recipe for disaster that was bound to injure someone.

There are also 10 anonymous John Does in the manufacturing, supply and sale chain that Antrobus also charges with negligent work in producing the iPod touch.

In an unusual turn for such suits against Apple, the plaintiff is not only looking for a specific amount in advance of any trial, at least $75,000, but isn’t seeking class action status to represent all iPod touch owners.

Second lawsuit emerges over defective iMac displays

The same can’t be said for the second lawsuit, which was submitted on the same day to a Northern District of California court and hopes to represent a wide swath of iMac owners.

Florida resident Roman Huff observes that his 17-inch iMac bought in November 2006 — here labeled an iMac G5 despite clearly being an Intel-based model — is representative of a display defect that affects nearly all owners of that generation of the computer.

The complaint echoes those of a similar January lawsuit and says that “thousands” of iMac owners start to see vertical lines appear on their LCDs months after first use. These gradually multiply and wash out the color of the display to where it’s unusable; in an all-in-one desktop, this renders the entire system useless, Huff’s suit contends.

An example of a 2006 iMac’s vertical line defect.

Apple is not only said to have been violating California’s Business & Professional and Commercial Codes by failing to properly test the displays, and therefore knowingly selling defective systems, but of unfairly skewing its warranty terms to evade repairing or replacing the iMacs out of its own pocket. Although the flaw reportedly exists in every affected iMac from the outset, Apple insists that any iMac outside of its one-year warranty, including Huff’s, must be repaired at its owner’s expense: in some cases costing as much as $800, or more than half the original price of the system.

As such, Huff asks Apple to refund the repair or replacement costs for any US resident who bought a defective iMac from 2005, when G5 models were produced, through to the present.

Apple hasn’t publicly commented on either of the lawsuits and typically doesn’t discuss court cases. However, the iPod touch suit is, so far, unique; Apple has had to replace iPod nanos that caught on fire due to power glitches, but hasn’t had a similar rash of complaints for its touchscreen devices.

Astronauts aboard the International Space Station hunkered down this week while waiting to find out if a piece of space junk would hit their temporary abode at about 20,000 mph.

The crew took cover in the Soyuz TMA-13 capsule briefly Thursday morning, while waiting for the object to pass after ground control alerted them that it could hit the station. NASA estimated the piece of space junk to be about 5 inches in diameter, according to a brief online report about the incident.

“With the uncertainty of it, we are wanting to take a conservative approach,” a NASA mission control employee at Johnson Space Center in Houston explained to those aboard the space station. “It’s a low probability of hit. However, the object is rather large, from what we can track, and if it does happen to hit the ISS, we’re talking only about a 10-minute reserve time.”

She advised the crew to prepare to close the U.S. segment and hatches.

Crew members asked her to clarify whether they were supposed to board the Soyuz “right now.” They were and they did. Within minutes, the crew was alerted that the object had passed.

Then ISS Cmdr. Michael Fincke urged ground crews to do what they could to ensure that the day’s activities, including ham radio transmissions to schools, could proceed.

Moments after that, Russian ground control indicated the object had passed, and their U.S. counterparts confirmed the information.

“We are all very happy that [it] has passed with no impact,” the NASA employee said. “That’s great news.”

Earlier this week, NASA announced that people on Earth could now watch the ISS through video showing the outside during some times of day. The live cam was not available as the astronauts hunkered down, but an audio recording of the communications between the astronauts and ground crews is available on NASA’s Web site.

It’s unclear exactly how close the debris came. If it had hit, the ISS would likely have been crippled. It’s likely the crew would have tried to undock from the station and re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere aboard the Soyuz.
Source:informationweek

Wondering what to do with your stash of old batteries or the cans of unneeded paint taking up space in your garage? You know you shouldn’t throw them out, but it really is time to get rid of them.

Resist the temptation to toss them in the trash anyway. The reason: They (and everything on the list below) contain toxic chemicals capable of contaminating the environment if not disposed of properly.

Unlike items that are picked up at the curb, you’ll have to make a special effort to unload these ones responsibly. But, with a little advance planning and some good info, you’ll see that it’s really quite simple to dispose of these seemingly mysterious items. Here’s how:

* Batteries. Recycling rechargeable batteries is fairly easy. Home Depot, Staples, Radio Shack, Best Buy, and other retailers take them back free of charge. There are fewer options for single-use batteries, but look for bins at your local Whole Foods Market, Ikea, or library. Otherwise, your best bet is the local household hazardous waste drop-off site. Where is it and what are your closest drop-off options? Search here for answers.

* CFLs. These energy-efficient bulbs are becoming easier to get rid of. Just drop old bulbs off at any Home Depot or Ikea for free recycling. Or ask about CFL recycling at your local Ace Hardware or home improvement store. You can search for other nearby solutions.

* Electronics. Every retailer that takes back rechargeable batteries also accepts mobile phones, as do most wireless providers. For computers, cameras, televisions, and others it’s worthwhile do a little homework because some stores charge fees depending on item and brand. Check out Best Buy, Staples, and Office Depot to see what’s the best fit. Some places, like Radio Shack, have trade-in programs where you can receive store credit for your old gadgets.

* Motor Oil. In case you need some motivation, consider this factoid from Earth911: Every gallon of used motor oil that’s improperly disposed of can contaminate one million gallons of drinking water. Bring it to Wal-Mart, Autozone, Jiffy Lube, or search online for more convenient choices.

* Paint. It’s among the harder items in this group to dispose of, but it’s worth it and totally doable. If the paint is still in good shape, consider donating it. As of now, there aren’t any retailers that accept used paint so you’ll need to make a special trip. Search Earth911 for a comprehensive list of options.

Computer security is a branch of technology known as information security as applied to computers. The objective of computer security varies and can include protection of information from theft or corruption, or the preservation of availability, as defined in the security policy.

Computer security imposes requirements on computers that are different from most system requirements because they often take the form of constraints on what computers are not supposed to do. This makes computer security particularly challenging because it is hard enough just to make computer programs do everything they are designed to do correctly. Furthermore, negative requirements are deceptively complicated to satisfy and require exhaustive testing to verify, which is impractical for most computer programs. Computer security provides a technical strategy to convert negative requirements to positive enforceable rules. For this reason, computer security is often more technical and mathematical than some computer science fields.

Typical approaches to improving computer security (in approximate order of strength) can include the following:

* Physically limit access to computers to only those who will not compromise security.
* Hardware mechanisms that impose rules on computer programs, thus avoiding depending on computer programs for computer security.
* Operating system mechanisms that impose rules on programs to avoid trusting computer programs.
* Programming strategies to make computer programs dependable and resist subversion.

Secure operating systems

One use of the term computer security refers to technology to implement a secure operating system. Much of this technology is based on science developed in the 1980s and used to produce what may be some of the most impenetrable operating systems ever. Though still valid, the technology is in limited use today, primarily because it imposes some changes to system management and also because it is not widely understood. Such ultra-strong secure operating systems are based on operating system kernel technology that can guarantee that certain security policies are absolutely enforced in an operating environment. An example of such a Computer security policy is the Bell-LaPadula model. The strategy is based on a coupling of special microprocessor hardware features, often involving the memory management unit, to a special correctly implemented operating system kernel. This forms the foundation for a secure operating system which, if certain critical parts are designed and implemented correctly, can ensure the absolute impossibility of penetration by hostile elements. This capability is enabled because the configuration not only imposes a security policy, but in theory completely protects itself from corruption. Ordinary operating systems, on the other hand, lack the features that assure this maximal level of security. The design methodology to produce such secure systems is precise, deterministic and logical.

Systems designed with such methodology represent the state of the art of computer security although products using such security are not widely known. In sharp contrast to most kinds of software, they meet specifications with verifiable certainty comparable to specifications for size, weight and power. Secure operating systems designed this way are used primarily to protect national security information, military secrets, and the data of international financial institutions. These are very powerful security tools and very few secure operating systems have been certified at the highest level (Orange Book A-1) to operate over the range of “Top Secret” to “unclassified” (including Honeywell SCOMP, USAF SACDIN, NSA Blacker and Boeing MLS LAN.) The assurance of security depends not only on the soundness of the design strategy, but also on the assurance of correctness of the implementation, and therefore there are degrees of security strength defined for COMPUSEC. The Common Criteria quantifies security strength of products in terms of two components, security functionality and assurance level (such as EAL levels), and these are specified in a Protection Profile for requirements and a Security Target for product descriptions. None of these ultra-high assurance secure general purpose operating systems have been produced for decades or certified under the Common Criteria.

In USA parlance, the term High Assurance usually suggests the system has the right security functions that are implemented robustly enough to protect DoD and DoE classified information. Medium assurance suggests it can protect less valuable information, such as income tax information. Secure operating systems designed to meet medium robustness levels of security functionality and assurance have seen wider use within both government and commercial markets. Medium robust systems may provide the same the security functions as high assurance secure operating systems but do so at a lower assurance level (such as Common Criteria levels EAL4 or EAL5). Lower levels mean we can be less certain that the security functions are implemented flawlessly, and therefore less dependable. These systems are found in use on web servers, guards, database servers, and management hosts and are used not only to protect the data stored on these systems but also to provide a high level of protection for network connections and routing services.

Security architecture

Security Architecture can be defined as the design artifacts that describe how the security controls (security countermeasures) are positioned, and how they relate to the overall information technology architecture. These controls serve the purpose to maintain the system’s quality attributes, among them confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability and assurance.”[1]. In simpler words, a security architecture is the plan that shows where security measures need to be placed. If the plan describes a specific solution then, prior to building such a plan, one would make a risk analysis. If the plan describes a generic high level design (reference architecture) then the plan should be based on a threat analysis.

Security by design

The technologies of computer security are based on logic. There is no universal standard notion of what secure behavior is. “Security” is a concept that is unique to each situation. Security is extraneous to the function of a computer application, rather than ancillary to it, thus security necessarily imposes restrictions on the application’s behavior.

There are several approaches to security in computing, sometimes a combination of approaches is valid:

1. Trust all the software to abide by a security policy but the software is not trustworthy (this is computer insecurity).
2. Trust all the software to abide by a security policy and the software is validated as trustworthy (by tedious branch and path analysis for example).
3. Trust no software but enforce a security policy with mechanisms that are not trustworthy (again this is computer insecurity).
4. Trust no software but enforce a security policy with trustworthy mechanisms.

Many systems have unintentionally resulted in the first possibility. Since approach two is expensive and non-deterministic, its use is very limited. Approaches one and three lead to failure. Because approach number four is often based on hardware mechanisms and avoids abstractions and a multiplicity of degrees of freedom, it is more practical. Combinations of approaches two and four are often used in a layered architecture with thin layers of two and thick layers of four.

There are myriad strategies and techniques used to design security systems. There are few, if any, effective strategies to enhance security after design.

One technique enforces the principle of least privilege to great extent, where an entity has only the privileges that are needed for its function. That way even if an attacker gains access to one part of the system, fine-grained security ensures that it is just as difficult for them to access the rest.

Furthermore, by breaking the system up into smaller components, the complexity of individual components is reduced, opening up the possibility of using techniques such as automated theorem proving to prove the correctness of crucial software subsystems. This enables a closed form solution to security that works well when only a single well-characterized property can be isolated as critical, and that property is also assessable to math. Not surprisingly, it is impractical for generalized correctness, which probably cannot even be defined, much less proven. Where formal correctness proofs are not possible, rigorous use of code review and unit testing represent a best-effort approach to make modules secure.

The design should use “defense in depth”, where more than one subsystem needs to be violated to compromise the integrity of the system and the information it holds. Defense in depth works when the breaching of one security measure does not provide a platform to facilitate subverting another. Also, the cascading principle acknowledges that several low hurdles does not make a high hurdle. So cascading several weak mechanisms does not provide the safety of a single stronger mechanism.

Subsystems should default to secure settings, and wherever possible should be designed to “fail secure” rather than “fail insecure” (see fail safe for the equivalent in safety engineering). Ideally, a secure system should require a deliberate, conscious, knowledgeable and free decision on the part of legitimate authorities in order to make it insecure.

In addition, security should not be an all or nothing issue. The designers and operators of systems should assume that security breaches are inevitable. Full audit trails should be kept of system activity, so that when a security breach occurs, the mechanism and extent of the breach can be determined. Storing audit trails remotely, where they can only be appended to, can keep intruders from covering their tracks. Finally, full disclosure helps to ensure that when bugs are found the “window of vulnerability” is kept as short as possible.

Early history of security by design

The early Multics operating system was notable for its early emphasis on computer security by design, and Multics was possibly the very first operating system to be designed as a secure system from the ground up. In spite of this, Multics’ security was broken, not once, but repeatedly. The strategy was known as ‘penetrate and test’ and has become widely known as a non-terminating process that fails to produce computer security. This led to further work on computer security that prefigured modern security engineering techniques producing closed form processes that terminate.

Secure coding

If the operating environment is not based on a secure operating system capable of maintaining a domain for its own execution, and capable of protecting application code from malicious subversion, and capable of protecting the system from subverted code, then high degrees of security are understandably not possible. While such secure operating systems are possible and have been implemented, most commercial systems fall in a ‘low security’ category because they rely on features not supported by secure operating systems (like portability, et al.). In low security operating environments, applications must be relied on to participate in their own protection. There are ‘best effort’ secure coding practices that can be followed to make an application more resistant to malicious subversion.

In commercial environments, the majority of software subversion vulnerabilities result from a few known kinds of coding defects. Common software defects include buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, integer overflow, and code/command injection.

Some common languages such as C and C++ are vulnerable to all of these defects (see Seacord, “Secure Coding in C and C++”). Other languages, such as Java, are more resistant to some of these defects, but are still prone to code/command injection and other software defects which facilitate subversion.

Recently another bad coding practice has come under scrutiny; dangling pointers. The first known exploit for this particular problem was presented in July 2007. Before this publication the problem was known but considered to be academic and not practically exploitable.

In summary, ’secure coding’ can provide significant payback in low security operating environments, and therefore worth the effort. Still there is no known way to provide a reliable degree of subversion resistance with any degree or combination of ’secure coding.’

Capabilities vs. ACLs

Within computer systems, the two fundamental means of enforcing privilege separation are access control lists (ACLs) and capabilities. The semantics of ACLs have been proven to be insecure in many situations (e.g., Confused deputy problem). It has also been shown that ACL’s promise of giving access to an object to only one person can never be guaranteed in practice. Both of these problems are resolved by capabilities. This does not mean practical flaws exist in all ACL-based systems, but only that the designers of certain utilities must take responsibility to ensure that they do not introduce flaws.

Unfortunately, for various historical reasons, capabilities have been mostly restricted to research operating systems and commercial OSs still use ACLs. Capabilities can, however, also be implemented at the language level, leading to a style of programming that is essentially a refinement of standard object-oriented design. An open source project in the area is the E language.

First the Plessey System 250 and then Cambridge CAP computer demonstrated the use of capabilities, both in hardware and software, in the 1970s, so this technology is hardly new. A reason for the lack of adoption of capabilities may be that ACLs appeared to offer a ‘quick fix’ for security without pervasive redesign of the operating system and hardware.

The most secure computers are those not connected to the Internet and shielded from any interference. In the real world, the most security comes from operating systems where security is not an add-on, such as OS/400 from IBM. This almost never shows up in lists of vulnerabilities for good reason. Years may elapse between one problem needing remediation and the next.

A good example of a secure system is EROS. But see also the article on secure operating systems. TrustedBSD is an example of an open source project with a goal, among other things, of building capability functionality into the FreeBSD operating system. Much of the work is already done.

Applications

Computer security is critical in almost any technology-driven industry which operates on computer systems. The issues of computer based systems and addressing their countless vulnerabilities are an integral part of maintaining an operational industry.

In aviation

The aviation industry is especially important when analyzing computer security because the involved risks include expensive equipment and cargo, transportation infrastructure, and human life. Security can be compromised by hardware and software malpractice, human error, and faulty operating environments. Threats that exploit computer vulnerabilities can stem from sabotage, espionage, industrial competition, terrorist attack, mechanical malfunction, and human error. [4]

The consequences of a successful deliberate or inadvertent misuse of a computer system in the aviation industry range from loss of confidentiality to loss of system integrity, which may lead to more serious concerns such as data theft or loss, network and air traffic control outages, which in turn can lead to airport closures, loss of aircraft, loss of passenger life. Military systems that control munitions can pose an even greater risk.

A proper attack does not need to be very high tech or well funded for a power outage at an airport alone can cause repercussions worldwide. [5]. One of the easiest and, arguably, the most difficult to trace security vulnerabilities is achievable by transmitting unauthorized communications over specific radio frequencies. These transmissions may spoof air traffic controllers or simply disrupt communications altogether. These incidents are very common, having altered flight courses of commercial aircraft and caused panic and confusion in the past. Controlling aircraft over oceans is especially dangerous because radar surveillance only extends 175 to 225 miles offshore. Beyond the radar’s sight controllers must rely on periodic radio communications with a third party.

Lightning, power fluctuations, surges, brown-outs, blown fuses, and various other power outages instantly disable all computer systems, since they are dependent on electrical source. Other accidental and intentional faults have caused significant disruption of safety critical systems throughout the last few decades and dependence on reliable communication and electrical power only jeopardizes computer safety.

Notable system accidents

In 1983, Korean Airlines Flight 007, a Boeing 747 was shot down by Soviet Su-15 jets after a navigation computer malfunction caused the aircraft to steer 185 miles off course into Soviet Union airspace. All 269 passengers were killed.

In 1994, over a hundred intrusions were made by unidentified hackers into the Rome Laboratory, the US Air Force’s main command and research facility. Using trojan horse viruses, hackers were able to obtain unrestricted access to Rome’s networking systems and remove traces of their activities. The intruders were able to obtain classified files, such as air tasking order systems data and furthermore able to penetrate connected networks of National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, some Defense contractors, and other private sector organizations, by posing as a trusted Rome center user.

Electromagnetic interference is another threat to computer safety and in 1989, a United States Air Force F-16 jet accidentally dropped a 230 kg bomb in West Georgia after unspecified interference caused the jet’s computers to release it.

A similar telecommunications accident also happened in 1994, when two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were destroyed by F-15 aircraft in Iraq because the IFF system’s encryption system malfunctioned.[citation needed]

Terminology

The following terms used in engineering secure systems are explained below.

* Firewalls can either be hardware devices or software programs. They provide some protection from online intrusion, but since they allow some applications (e.g. web browsers) to connect to the Internet, they don’t protect against some unpatched vulnerabilities in these applications (e.g. lists of known unpatched holes from Secunia and SecurityFocus).

* Automated theorem proving and other verification tools can enable critical algorithms and code used in secure systems to be mathematically proven to meet their specifications.
* Thus simple microkernels can be written so that we can be sure they don’t contain any bugs: eg EROS and Coyotos.

A bigger OS, capable of providing a standard API like POSIX, can be built on a secure microkernel using small API servers running as normal programs. If one of these API servers has a bug, the kernel and the other servers are not affected: e.g. Hurd or Minix 3.

* Cryptographic techniques can be used to defend data in transit between systems, reducing the probability that data exchanged between systems can be intercepted or modified.
* Strong authentication techniques can be used to ensure that communication end-points are who they say they are.

Secure cryptoprocessors can be used to leverage physical security techniques into protecting the security of the computer system.

* Chain of trust techniques can be used to attempt to ensure that all software loaded has been certified as authentic by the system’s designers.
* Mandatory access control can be used to ensure that privileged access is withdrawn when privileges are revoked. For example, deleting a user account should also stop any processes that are running with that user’s privileges.
* Capability and access control list techniques can be used to ensure privilege separation and mandatory access control. The next sections discuss their use.

Some of the following items may belong to the computer insecurity article:

* application with known security flaws should not be run. Either leave it turned off until it can be patched or otherwise fixed, or delete it and replace it with some other application. Publicly known flaws are the main entry used by worms to automatically break into a system and then spread to other systems connected to it. The security website Secunia provides a search tool for unpatched known flaws in popular products.

Cryptographic techniques involve transforming information, scrambling it so it becomes unreadable during transmission. The intended recipient can unscramble the message, but eavesdroppers cannot.
Cryptographic techniques involve transforming information, scrambling it so it becomes unreadable during transmission. The intended recipient can unscramble the message, but eavesdroppers cannot.

* Backups are a way of securing information; they are another copy of all the important computer files kept in another location. These files are kept on hard disks, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, and tapes. Suggested locations for backups are a fireproof, waterproof, and heat proof safe, or in a separate, offsite location than that in which the original files are contained. Some individuals and companies also keep their backups in safe deposit boxes inside bank vaults. There is also a fourth option, which involves using one of the file hosting services that backs up files over the Internet for both business and individuals.
o Backups are also important for reasons other than security. Natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or tornadoes, may strike the building where the computer is located. The building can be on fire, or an explosion may occur. There needs to be a recent backup at an alternate secure location, in case of such kind of disaster. Further, it is recommended that the alternate location be placed where the same disaster would not affect both locations. Examples of alternate disaster recovery sites being compromised by the same disaster that affected the primary site include having had a primary site in World Trade Center I and the recovery site in 7 World Trade Center, both of which were destroyed in the 9/11 attack, and having one’s primary site and recovery site in the same coastal region, which leads to both being vulnerable to hurricane damage (e.g. primary site in New Orleans and recovery site in Jefferson Parish, both of which were hit by Hurricane Katrina in 2005). The backup media should be moved between the geographic sites in a secure manner, in order to prevent them from being stolen.

* Anti-virus software consists of computer programs that attempt to identify, thwart and eliminate computer viruses and other malicious software (malware).

* Firewalls are systems which help protect computers and computer networks from attack and subsequent intrusion by restricting the network traffic which can pass through them, based on a set of system administrator defined rules.

* Access authorization restricts access to a computer to group of users through the use of authentication systems. These systems can protect either the whole computer - such as through an interactive logon screen - or individual services, such as an FTP server. There are many methods for identifying and authenticating users, such as passwords, identification cards, and, more recently, smart cards and biometric systems.

* Encryption is used to protect the message from the eyes of others. It can be done in several ways by switching the characters around, replacing characters with others, and even removing characters from the message. These have to be used in combination to make the encryption secure enough, that is to say, sufficiently difficult to crack. Public key encryption is a refined and practical way of doing encryption. It allows for example anyone to write a message for a list of recipients, and only those recipients will be able to read that message.
* Intrusion-detection systems can scan a network for people that are on the network but who should not be there or are doing things that they should not be doing, for example trying a lot of passwords to gain access to the network.
* Pinging The ping application can be used by potential crackers to find if an IP address is reachable. If a cracker finds a computer they can try a port scan to detect and attack services on that computer.
* Social engineering awareness keeps employees aware of the dangers of social engineering and/or having a policy in place to prevent social engineering can reduce successful breaches of the network and servers.
* Honey pots are computers that are either intentionally or unintentionally left vulnerable to attack by crackers. They can be used to catch crackers or fix vulnerabilities.

Hot on the heels of the D90 we find the 21-megapixel EOS 5D Mark II, a $2,699 monster with a 50-25,600 ISO range with a full-frame 24×36mm CMOS sensor. The kit with lens costs $3,499.

Most interestingly is the 1920 x 1080 pixel HD video at 30 fps. While these new video features are a bit hard to stomach - DSLRs take pictures well but rarely take good video - but clearly some of this tech is getting more and more impressive. It’s basically a nice value-add.

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OKYO - Toyota has developed a motorized stand-up-and-ride Segway lookalike designed to help people scoot around at malls and airports.

But the “Winglet,” shown Friday in Tokyo, takes some getting used to. A demonstrator was visibly worried about its safety while accompanying a reporter who cautiously tried it on a short course in a Toyota showroom.

Toyota officials insist anyone can learn to ride it with some practice, including the elderly — its major target buyer.

Still, Toyota Motor Corp. has no plans yet to turn the Winglet into a commercial product. The Japanese automaker will start testing the two-wheeler this year at an airport and resort complex and next year at a shopping mall, all in Japan, to get user feedback. Overseas test plans are undecided.

The Winglet goes up to 3.7 mph, about the same speed as pedestrians, far slower than 12.5-mph Segway, which costs $5,000. The Winglet can go about 3 miles before needing to be recharged.

It is designed to stop easily with little pressure, pivot full-circle and go smoothly over bumps on roads. And it is designed to respond almost intuitively — moving forward when you lean to the front, and turning when you sway to the right or left, similar to skiing. One of three models shown comes with a protruding handle that can be grabbed and used like a steering wheel.

Toyota executive Takeshi Uchiyamada, who zipped around on a Winglet as though he was on a skateboard, said the company is experimenting with new ways of mobility as part of a company strategy to spread robotics.

“We hope to create friendly robots that can exist side by side with people,” Uchiyamada said. “Winglet will help everyone move around safely and stay active.”

Winglet evolved out of Toyota’s takeover of parts of Sony Corp.’s robotics division last year. Sony, reshaping itself under Chief Executive Howard Stringer, decided to focus on electronics and wipe out its Aibo pet robot and other peripheral businesses.

Toyota envisions a future in which Winglet will be packed with wireless technology so it relays shopping information at stores. Or it may move on its own, Uchiyamada said. So it might go recharge its batteries itself, or come pick you up when you beckon it, toting your luggage.

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Chances are it’s the price of gas, not auto insurance, that’s driving you to the poor house.

But if you want to cut your auto insurance premiums to the bone, stay away from small, fast cars.

“It’s a common denominator among vehicles that have the highest losses — a lot of smaller, sportier vehicles, says Russ Rader, spokesman for the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.

“Contrary to the idea that smaller cars can help you avoid crashes, the data shows that small cars get into more accidents,” he says. “If you feel like you have a vehicle that can zip in and out of traffic, chances are you’ll do that.”

More from Bankrate.com:

• 20 Things to Know About Auto Insurance

• Finding Private Health Insurance

• Bankrate’s 2008 Insurance Guide Tools

Each year, the institute, and its sister organization, the Highway Loss Data Institute, analyze the actual insurance losses associated with the most popular vehicle makes and models. Since insurance companies use similar kinds of data to set premiums, the rankings give consumers a window into how their vehicle choices affect their auto premiums.

And, once again, the data suggests that small cars and speed are an expensive combination for insurers — especially with a young driver behind the wheel.

“Sporty cars tend to be driven in ways that lead to more crashes,” says Rader. “They also tend to be driven by younger, riskier drivers.” And smaller cars also tend to be more affordable, which makes them more attractive to those same younger drivers, he says.

“The Subaru Impreza WRX, the Mitsubishi Lancer, the Acura RSX, the Nissan Sentra SE-R — these vehicles have the highest rates of collision,” says Rader. “And age is a part of it. It’s how these vehicles are driven.”

10 Most-Expensive Cars to Insure

The 10 vehicles that account for the highest dollar amount of losses for insurance companies (starting with the most expensive) are:

1. Cadillac Escalade EXT 4WD
2. Subaru Impreza WRX 4WD
3. Hyundai Tiburon
4. Mitsubishi Lancer
5. Scion tC
6. Acura RSX
7. Nissan Sentra SE-R
8. Suzuki Forenza
9. Nissan Sentra/Mitsubishi Eclipse
10. Chevrolet Cobalt two-door

Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, based on 2004-2006 models

10 Least-Expensive Cars to Insure

The 10 vehicles that account for the lowest dollar amount of losses for insurance companies (starting with the least expensive) are:

1. Ford Five Hundred 4WD (now the Ford Taurus)
2. Buick Rendezvous 4WD
3. Buick Lucerne/Buick Rainier 4WD/Honda Odyssey
4. Ford Freestyle 4WD/Subaru Outback 4WD
5. Buick Rendezvous/Honda Pilot
6. Chrysler Town & Country LWB
7. Honda Pilot 4WD
8. Buick LaCrosse/Chevrolet Uplander/Ford Escape/Volvo V70
9. Dodge Grand Caravan/Ford Freestyle 4WD
10. Ford Explorer 4WD/GMC Sierra 1500 4WD/Toyota Highlander/Toyota Sienna

Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, based on 2004-2006 models

The car that comes in fifth on the “most expensive to insure” list, the Scion tC, has one of the youngest demographics. Thirty-five percent of drivers are under 25, says Kim Hazelbaker, senior vice president for the Highway Loss Data Institute.

But the car at the top of the list, the Cadillac Escalade, bucks the trend. So why is a luxury SUV most commonly driven by a more affluent and comparative older clientele on the list? Two words: theft magnet.

“The Escalade has a lot of buzz in the entertainment industry,” says Rader. “You can’t watch an episode of ‘Cribs’ without seeing an Escalade. So it’s desirable.”

So desirable that owners face a comprehensive premium of six times the national average, says Hazelbaker.

“It’s one of the iconic vehicles that continues to be popular with pop culture stars, so it continues to be popular for people to steal,” he says. Plus, “everything in an Escalade bolts into a Suburban,” he says.

Least Expensive to Insure

The vehicles that are likely to have the lowest insurance costs? Today’s version of the good old fashioned family car, says Rader. These skew toward large sedans, or midsize SUVs or minivans.

“They tend to be driven by people who are not as likely to speed or drive recklessly,” he says.

And they also aren’t as likely to be used to commute to and from work, says Hazelbaker. That means the cars aren’t on the road during rush hour, which also lowers their risk.

“We have an awful lot of soccer mom cars on that list,” he says. “The (Buick) Rendezvous, the (Subaru) Outback, the (Honda) Pilot, the Chrysler Town & Country — all of these are sort of ‘mommy mobiles.’”

And none of the vehicles on the cheapest to insure list “are very large,” either, says Hazelbaker. “As the size of an SUV or pickup goes up, you do have higher losses.”

The all-around least expensive to insure? The Ford Five Hundred, the study found. A medium-sized, affordable sedan now known as the Ford Taurus, “it’s probably driven by a favorable demographic in a favorable way,” he says. “It’s a suburban family second car.”

Cars of this type “are probably living in a garage,” which makes them less of a theft target. Plus they tend to be less desirable to thieves, he says.

“If you’re going to pick out something to steal, what would you choose?” says Hazelbaker.

When Bigger Isn’t Better for Premiums

But larger vehicles don’t automatically mean lower premiums. Some super-size vehicles could actually increase the cost of your insurance.

When two cars collide, the average repair cost for each is about $3,000, says Hazelbaker. But some larger vehicles are routinely linked to higher-dollar damage to other cars. And that could cost you in terms of more expensive insurance.

The top five linked to highest dollar damages to other cars, according to the institute, are as follows.

1. Hummer H2 SUT 4dr 4WD
2. Hummer H3 4dr 4WD
3. Hummer H2 4dr 4WD
4. Dodge Ram 2500 mega cab 4WD
5. Toyota Highlander Hybrid 4dr

“They’re big, heavy vehicles that tend to inflict a lot of damage on what they hit,” says Rader. See the top 10 list.

Keeping Premiums Down

Want to keep your premiums low? Talk to your agent before you buy your next vehicle, says Loretta Worters, vice president of the Insurance Information Institute, an industry organization. Once you’ve narrowed your choices to two or three models, ask if any of the premiums will be significantly different. Note if any of the models have high repair costs or theft rates, she says.

It can be tricky. Even different models of the same car can have different costs when it comes to insurance. “A different motor or different luxury items” can change your premium, says Worters.

One example is a convertible. That ragtop could cost you more than the hardtop version of the same car, says Worters. A convertible is “easier to get into, so it might be more costly,” she says.

Another tip off to high-priced premiums: higher-priced cars.

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• How Technology Can Help Trim Auto Insurance

• Insurers Offer Low-Mileage Discounts

• Reframing the Discussion Around Small-Car Safety
Visit the Insurance Center

“The more expensive the car is, all things being equal, the more it’s going to cost to insure,” says Dick Luedke, spokesman for the State Farm Insurance Cos.

And each car has more than one score to consider. The same car that shows lower-than-average losses in terms of inflicting damage might be worse in terms of theft. But insurance companies, and the premiums, take the whole package into account.

So what categories make the most difference, when it comes to your premium?

“The biggest portion of auto insurance is for liability,” says Luedke. Next is collision and comprehensive, fairly equally. And after that comes medical payments, he says.

Smart money: Look at your car’s scores in all categories, but in the end, shop safety. Pick up great safety information, like crash tests results, rollover ratings, recalls, service bulletins and consumer complaints with the following sites.

And the car is only part of the equation. You, your lifestyle and your driving record will also have a sizable impact on the premium. To calculate your premium, insurance companies analyze everything from your age, residence, and driving patterns to your prior driving record and credit history.

When it comes to the premium, says Hazelbaker, “the person in the vehicle makes the most difference.”

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